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ABSTRACT 
 
By design, copyright is a legal field that is not distinctively designed for 
redistribution. And yet, numerous fairness scholars and other critics of the 
economics paradigm quite markedly argue that copyright law should be 
based upon some measure of distribution, not efficiency.  
 
This essay argues that copyright law should not promote distributive justice 
concerns, subject to narrow exceptions and that other more efficient law 
such as taxation and welfare laws should do that instead. It does so in 
accordance to the prevailing welfare economics interpretative approach to 
copyright jurisprudence, with emphasis on the latest Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file 
sharing litigation.  
 
It focuses on the leading classes of distributive injustice that have emerged 
in the present day Internet, referring to poor infringers, poor creators and 
wealthy copyright industries. At least in these classes of individuals, this 
essay argues, redistribution through copyright law, arguably, offers no 
advantage over redistribution through the income tax system and other 
transfer mechanisms and laws and typically is less efficient in doing so. 
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A.  Introduction 
 
Copyright law, like all so many normative theories concerning social 
arrangements, which stood the test of time, seems to finally have collapsed 
into egalitarian argumentation.3 One cannot but be reminded of Will 
Kymlicka's fatalistic foretell about how, under the burden of time, this 
becomes the fate of all so many political theories of contemporary days.4
Contemporary copyright scholars, particularly, arguing in favor of 
independent fairness concerns growingly seem to favor distributive justice 
within copyright jurisprudence while ultimately favoring the poor and 
penalizing the wealthy.5 Distributive justice argumentation, remarkably, 
comes and is most commonly litigated also from the part of copyright 
 
3 See, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 81-85 
(1990); Amartya K. Sen, Inequality Reexamined 12 (1992) ("[E]very normative theory 
of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time seems to demand equality of 
something...."). 
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Property and need: The welfare state and theories of 
distributive justice, Stan. L. Rev, Vol 28, No. 5 (May, 1976), 877-902. See, also, 
discussion herein. 
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holders,6 including motion picture studios, recording companies, 
songwriters, music publishers and even venture capitalists7 who typically 
are accused of promoting profit self-maximization, or even efficiency at 
large on the expense of noticeably disadvantaged users, but also poor 
creators and amateurs. Thus, within the recent copyright file-sharing 
litigation, those who defend the latter copyright concerns, or seek to extend 
it, fairly often bemoan the decline in profits that record companies have 
suffered8 and that Hollywood may face – wrongly using this same 
argumentation.9 Like other social theories that ended up arguing for 
equality, different approaches to distributive justice within copyright 
jurisprudence seem to have gained themselves what already threatens to 
befall to an unmarked impetus. 
 
Traditionally, copyright law was not seen as a vehicle for promoting 
distributive justice or 'individual well being'.10 Copyright, thus, 
conventionally was not used as an instrument of redistribution from one 
 
6 The studios and recording companies and the songwriters and music publishers filed 
separate suits against the defendants that were consolidated by the District Court. See, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, No. 04-480, slip op. (U.S. June 27, 
2005), at 2771. 
7 See, the amicus curiae brief of the National Venture Capital Association in the United 
State Supreme Court Grokster case regarding venture capitalist liability. Brief of the 
National Venture Capital Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
2005 WL 497759, at * 17 & n.14, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 1605 (2005) (No. 04-480) ("[T]he indeterminate reach of such 
secondary liability means that not merely start-up capital is at risk, but also the 
personal wealth of start-up's officers, directors, and investors...”) (Herein, ‘the Grokster 
case’). 
8 See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Recording Industry to Begin Collecting 
Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits Against File "Sharers" Who Illegally Offer Music 
Online, at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062503.asp (June 25, 2003) (Last 
visited 1 December 2005) (quoting Recording Industry Association of America 
President Cary Sherman as saying, "we cannot stand by while piracy takes a 
devastating toll on artists, musicians, songwriters, retailers and everyone in the music 
industry"). For evidence that services like Napster have in fact hurt the profits of record 
companies, see Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? 
The Evidence so Far (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript), at 
http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/records.pdf (Last visited 1 December 2005). 
9 See, e.g., Ronald Grover & Heather Green, The Digital Age Presents Hollywood Heist: 
Will Tinseltown Let Techies Steal the Show?, Bus. Wk., July 14, 2003, at 73, 76 
(reporting that Hollywood executives are concerned that the movie industry may suffer 
the same loss of profits suffered by the music industry). See, also, A press release from 
defendant Bertelsmann AG said that the tertiary liability suit was a "groundless and 
cynical effort" to recover from Bertelsmann's "deep pockets," and that U.S. copyright 
law does not extend to third-party lenders. Bertelsmann Seeks Dismissal of Copyright 
Infringement Lawsuits (July 17, 2003), online at http:// 
www.bertelsmann.de/documents/en/Motion_to_dismiss.pdf (visited December 1, 
2005). 
10 See 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright S1.03(A) (2002) 
(discussing the purpose of copyright); I Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 1.13.2 (2d ed. 
Supp. 2003).  
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individual or group to another. Instead, copyright originally has been based 
in the United States on the concept of efficient ownership and uniformly has 
been interpreted as a utilitarian device for maximizing social utility.11 The 
economic philosophy behind the clause 8 empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights,12 is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the most effective way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in science and useful arts.13 
Thus, courts traditionally upheld that when technological change has 
rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in 
light of its’ constitutional incentives,14 in reference to what is a tautological 
efficiency-based consideration of the common sense of the statute, to its 
purpose, and to the practical consequences of suggested interpretations.15 
More broadly, the sole purpose of intellectual property largely ignores 
distributive justice questions and instead focuses solely in "incentivizing" 
creativity.16 In balance, thus, lie the effect of copyright protection in 
encouraging the creation by reducing copying and its effect in discouraging 
 
11 Id. But see, Congress's early characterization of copyright as tax, as it appeared, for 
example, in Lord Macaulay's statement that copyright is "tax on readers for the purpose 
of giving a bounty to writers." Lord Thomas B. Macaulay, 56 Parl. Deb. 341, 350 (3d 
Ser.) (1841) (Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on Feb. 5, 1841). Thomas 
Macaulay, Speech Before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in 8 The works of 
Lord Macaulay 195, 199 (Lady Trevelyan ed. 1866), at 201. For modern day references 
to this particularly controversial, see, e.g., Dan Hunter and F. Gregory Lastowka, 
Amateur-to-amateur, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 951 (2004), at 953-954; Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 507 
(1945). 
12 See, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, Id. 
13 Id. See, also, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (""') (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
14 17 U.S.C.A. § 1; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. (Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 95 S.Ct. 2040, U.S.Pa. 1975; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc. 104 S.Ct. 774, U.S.Cal.,1984, at 432; Alameda Films SA de CV v. Authors Rights 
Restoration Corp. Inc. 331 F.3d 472, C.A.5 (Tex.),2003, at 482; Princeton University 
Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. 99 F.3d 1381 C.A.6 (Mich.), 1996, at 
1391); Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System Pte., Ltd. 61 F.3d 696, C.A.9 
(Cal.),1995, at 707; Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510 C.A.9 
(Cal.), 1992, at 1527; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc. 975 F.2d 832 
C.A.Fed. (Cal.), 1992, at 843; Computer Associates Intern., Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 
693 .A.2 (N.Y.), 1992, at 711; Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite 
Systems, Inc. 777 F.2d 393 .A.8 (Minn.), 1985, at 398; Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. 
Nintendo of America, Inc. 780 F.Supp. 1283 .D.Cal., 1991. at 1291; Encyclopaedia 
Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks 542 F.Supp. 1156 .C.N.Y., 1982, at 1167. 
15 See, U.S.--Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., C.A.8 
(Minn.), 777 F.2d 393, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 643, 479 U.S. 1005, 93 L.Ed.2d 699, 
rehearing denied 107 S.Ct. 964, 479 U.S. 1070, 93 L.Ed.2d 1012, and 109 S.Ct. 406, 
102 L.Ed.2d 393. see, also, 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § .5 
16 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Stephen 
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, 
and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 291-321 (1970); Joseph P. Liu, 
Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 409, 428 (2002). 
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the creation by raising the cost of their creation.17 Until recently, likewise, 
copyright scholars have made no serious attempts to link copyright policy to 
broader theory of distributive justice.18 
This paradigm is now continually challenged, as numerous ‘fairness 
scholars’ and other critics of the economics paradigm notably growingly 
argue that intellectual property and copyright law more specifically should 
be based upon some measure of distribution, not efficiency. This 
understanding of copyright, thus far, mostly gave rise to a plethora of side 
arguments, such as that copyright law, in fact, is remarkably similar to tax 
law, as intellectual property monopoly is in effect a negative tax intended to 
reward innovation,19 or that copyright law should be analogized with 
corporate welfare20 or social welfare,21 or the constitutional 
"encouragement" theory22, etc.23 Conceptually, that also means that 
distribution of wealth generated by limited creativity may be more important 
to public policy than encouraging overall growth in wealth,24 or cultural 
 
17 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The economic structure of intellectual 
property law (2003), at 69.  
18 Michael Abramowicz, An industrial approach to copyright law, 46 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 33 (2004), 104. 
19 See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; or, How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love Intellectual Property, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 453 (2002), at 481, 
482. 
20 See, Tom W. Bell, Author’s welfare: Copyright as a statutory mechanism for 
redistributing rights, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 229 (2003), at 229 (Hereinafter, ‘Bell, Author’s 
welfare’) ; Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in Copy 
fights: The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age 1, 6-7 (Adam Thierer 
& Clyde Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (hereinafter, ‘Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing’). 
21 See, Tom W. Bell, Author’s welfare, Ibid, at 229; Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing 
in Copyright and Patent Law, in Copy fights: The Future of Intellectual Property in the 
Information Age 1, 6-7 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews eds., 2002). 
22 See, Wendy J. Gordon, An inquiry into the merits of copyright: The challenges of 
consistency, consent, and encouragement theory, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343 (1989), at 
1414, in reference to U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23 See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Von Houweling, Distributive values in copyright, Texas L. 
Rev. (2005, forthcoming), at 31-34; Shubha Ghosh, supra note 19, at 475-82.; Tom W. 
Bell, Author’s welfare, supra note 20, at 229, 231; Tom W. Bell, Indelicate 
Imbalancing, supra note 23, at 6-7. See, also, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223-
226, 123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see, e.g., 
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 63, at 613 (stating that 
inefficiencies from compulsory terms and from redistribution through taxation "involve 
exactly the same kinds of waste," leaving a difficult empirical question as to which is 
preferable); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 
472, 508 (1980) (arguing that, because taxation as well as contractual regulation has 
efficiency costs, determining the preferable means of redistribution raises an empirical 
question that "must be resolved on a case-by-case basis"). Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, at 994 and Fn. 65 & 
accompanying text (hereinafter, ‘Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare’). 
24 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the allocative/distributive relationship in copyright, 
32 Hofstra L. Rev. 853 (2004), at 854. 
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well-being.25 This present fairness sway, notably, expanded into copyright 
jurisprudence at large, ranging from the fair use doctrine26 extension terms 
analysis,27 or compulsory licensing28 - all presumably insert distributive 
issues.29 More specifically, on the Internet recent critics add, copyright 
should as well serve the purpose of transferring wealth from artists to 
distributors to the public at large.30 To be sure, the limited work in legal 
academia directly addresses the possibility of redistribution through 
copyright law. That is, rather than by progressive taxation,31 welfare law,32 
transfer payments such as regulation of broadcasters and 
telecommunications companies to increase access in poor neighborhoods,33 
25 Daphna Lewinson-Zamir, The objectivity of well-being and the objectives of property 
law, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669 (2003), at 1673. See, discussion at Part B.2, Infra. 
26 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000) (fair use limitations on exclusive rights to copyright). See, e.g., 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982). (arguing that 
as the costs of contracting and of verifying income may prevent copyright owners from 
giving price breaks to low income consumers - these contracting costs are a type of 
market failure). Id. at 1628-30. 
27 See Joseph A. Lavigne, For limited times? Making rich kids richer via the copyright 
term extension act of 1996, 73 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 311 (1996), at 351 (criticizing 
the Copyright Extension Act 1996 from on distributive justice grounds disfavoring 
wealthy artists). 
28 17 U.S.C. §111(d) (requirement of compulsory license for secondary transmission of 
primary work); §115 (requirement of compulsory license for the making and 
distributing of phonorecords). 
29 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, supra note 24, at 856. 
30 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and 
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 305 (2002), at 305; 
Shubha Ghosh, Ibid, at 481, 482. See, also, discussion at Part B.2, infra. 
31 But see, Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for 
Equality: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797 (2000); Dagan, supra note 31, 
at 786 (focusing on takings doctrine). In the context of contract law, see also the 
seminal work of Anthony T. Kronman, supra note 23, at 475. It is yet important to 
distinguish between contractual-based redistribution like the one referred to by 
Kronman, and disputes between unfamiliar persons to the dispute, where parties are, in 
effect, ‘strangers’ prior to the dispute. The victims here are third parties. Next to 
copyright law disputes, other legal fields of analogy are nuisance law, automobile 
accident and pollution control. See, also, discussion in part D.1, herein. 
32 For example of welfare legislation, see, Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), a program effectively abolished by the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 
2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). Other programs 
falling within the scope of "social welfare" and "welfare" as used herein include those 
created by the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2011-2036 (West Supp. 2003) (creating 
program to improve diets of members of low-income households). 
33 Economists have long considered government expenditures together with taxation, 
recognizing government transfer payments as both increased income for individuals 
receiving them and also negative taxes from a fiscal perspective. See Richard A. 
Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 216, 295 (5th 
ed. 1989). See, also, Abramowicz, supra note 18, at 106. 
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or even employment opportunity programs though labor law and tax law34 - 
which all, by and large, echo a better perception that the generally greater 
efficiency of redistribution. Likewise, although the Supreme Court's 
analyses continue to treat the provision of economic incentives to produce 
new works as important, an "author's rights" or fairness-based strain of 
analysis, at times, has also emerged, such as in the Harper & Row, 
Publishers v. Nation Enters case35, and recently in Justice Souter’s 
perplexing secondary yet surprising consideration of the latter approach in 
his famous Grokster case opinion.36 
This essay argues that copyright law should not promote distributive justice 
concerns, subject to narrow exceptions and those other more efficient laws 
such as taxation and welfare laws should do that instead. It does so in 
accordance to the prevailing utilitarian interpretative approach to copyright 
jurisprudence, with emphasis on the latest Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing 
litigation. Part B opens with three leading critiques and flawed 
rationalizations of distributive justice that can be traced to libertarianism, 
liberty and well-being theory and even some narrow forms of efficiency 
within the copyright discourse.37 Focusing on a welfare economics 
approach, Part C critically depicts the three leading classes of distributive 
injustice that have emerged in the P2P tale of the present day Internet. It 
 
34 The U.S. tax system redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the federal government. See 
generally, Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-9833 (West Supp. 2002); Treasury 
Regulations for I.R.C., 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.0-1 to 801.6 (2003). Particularly see, Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-1564 (West Supp. 2003) (income taxes); id. §§ 2001-
2704 (2002) (estate and gift taxes); id. §§ 4001-5000 (miscellaneous excise taxes); id. 
§§ 5001-5881 (alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes). Many economists 
writing in the field of public economics study the distributive effects of taxation and 
other government policy. See, e.g., William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 
(1947); James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income 
Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971); Matti Tuomala, Optimal Income Tax and 
Redistribution (1990).  
35 See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). 
36 See the Grokster case, at 2776 and Fn. 8 & accompanying text, referring to Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223-226, 123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Brief for Sovereign Artists et al. as Amici Curiae 11 and Molly Van 
Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 Texas L.Rev. 1535, 1539-1540, 
1562-1564 (2005). To be safe, all these three sources support a fairness approach to 
distributive justice, while arguing for the widespread distribution of creative works. 
Notably, the Grokster court considers the argument whlile ignoring its controvercial 
rationale, as described, e.g., in Van Houweling’s basic consideration of the poorly 
financed statutes of such emerging new creators. Id. 
37 Lewinsohn-Zamir and Dagan offer a fourth personality theory argument within the 
context of takings doctrine. This argument, however, is less relevant to American 
copyright jurisprudence that largely rejected this civil-law based personality theory. 
See, e.g., Rudolf Monta, The Concept of Copyright Versus the Droit d’Auteur, 32 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 177 (1958-59). According to the latter, however, copyright owners would 
be more harmed when a certain work of art of theirs is unlawfully reallocated, than 
when a similar value is taken from their total wealth. Compare, Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
supra note 25, at 55; Dagan, supra note 31, at 787.  
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does so in three levels, referring to claims: 1) favoring the enriching of poor 
infringers, 2) poor creators and 3) the impoverishing of wealthy copyright 
industries. Part D then goes on arguing against copyright distributive justice, 
and does so fourfold, referring to: 1) the discriminatory tendency of 
distributive theory for both substantive copyright law and its remedial 
corollaries, due to a) long-term implications of progressive damages, b) the 
resulting disparity between litigating and non-litigating parties to disputes. 
Part D then continues on arguing against copyright distributive justice due 
to: 2) its over-expensive application within copyright law as a result of a) 
the adverse effects copyright-based redistribution has on work incentives, b) 
their diverse administrative costs, c) long run deriving consequences, and d) 
differences in the frequency of intervention they require; And due to 3) its 
imprecise consequences and 4) the social costs it inefficiently inflicts.  
 
Part E concludes with a caveat. In this essay's view, it is undesirable to 
instill our egalitarian commitments into copyright law, in which 
redistribution paradigmatically should remain only a side effect, even if their 
proposed function in this context is, indeed, rather moderate. In practice, 
moreover, it is often impossible to redistribute income through the choice of 
copyright law and that, even when it is possible, redistribution through the 
government’s tax, welfare and transfer system may be less discriminatory, 
cheaper and is likely to be more precise. 
 
B. Distributive Injustices: The Three Accounts 
 
1. Libertarian argumentation: Beyond Pareto superiority     
 
The first to oppose to the use of private law and copyright herein, as a 
mechanism for redistribution are the libertarians whose opposition derives 
from their general belief that the compulsory transfer of wealth is theft, 
regardless of how it is accomplished.38 When a private good is stolen, the 
theft necessarily deprives the original owner of possession. That has also 
been the view of the United States Department of Justice policy regarding 
 
38 See e.g., R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 149-53, 167-74 (1974); See, also, 
Buchanan, Political Equality and Private Property: The Distributional Paradox, In 
Markets and Morals 69-84 (G. Dworkin, G. Bennet, & P. Brown eds. 1977); Epstein, 
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293, 293-94 (1975). In the 
copyright context, See e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, supra note 30, at 305 (In this case, 
the use of Napster is not theft-- copyright is theft."). See, also, John Perry Barlow, 
Napster.com and the Death of the Music Industry, at 
http://www.sparklehouse.com/sparklehouse/mp3/barlow.html (Last visited 1 December 
2005).; see, also, Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & 
Com. 509, 513 (1996), at 512. 
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unauthorized downloading,39 or the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), and the trade association representing them, which 
unequivocally characterizing the free downloading of copyrighted material 
as an act of theft, arguing that those who download music online are 
"stealing" their intellectual property.40 Legislators considering the 1997 No 
Electronic Theft (NET) Act,41 a most recent draconian criminal copyright 
infringement law, equating copyright infringement with the theft of physical 
property.42 And yet, making an unauthorized copy however does not 
infringe the nonrivalrous nature of digital music.43 
This reference to distributive justice argumentations, theoretically, may be 
related to the tautological difficulty fairness scholars might have in dealing 
with Pareto-superiority. Whereby, if something is not Pareto efficient44 – 
there is a need to advance a diverse approach, potentially distributive. In 
other words, unless a legal rule is Pareto-superior to all other feasible rules, 
in the sense that no one would object to the adoption of that rule - there is a 
convincing need to press forward one or another normative argument which 
seeks to put in plain words why one group should be made better off at the 
expense of another.45 Because a public good such as a broadcast television 
program is characterized by nonrivalrous utilization, any number of 
individuals can copy an existing broadcast without in so doing depriving 
some other person of access.46 Evidently, if someone shoplifted a CD of the 
latest music group, that would constitute theft of a tangible, private good 
and would be punishable under applicable state laws. Such conduct would 
not comprise copyright infringement, however. Moreover, under applicable 
 
39 See, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Remarks at the Press Conference Announcing the Intellectual 
Property Rights Initiative (July 23, 1999), at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/dagipini.htm (Last visited 1 December 2005).. 
40 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Issues: Anti-Piracy, at http:// 
www.riaa.com/issues/piracy (Last visited 1 December 2005); Press Release, Motion 
Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., Motion Picture and Music Industries File Suit Against 
Scour.com (July 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.mpaa.org/Press/ScourPressRelease.htm (Last visited 1 December 2005). 
41 Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
506, 507; 18 U.S.C. § 2319, 2319A, 2320; 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000)); see also infra Part 
III.B.3 (discussing the NET Act). 
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450 n.33; see also United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 
234, 243 (5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that taping a copyrighted broadcast "does not 
implicate a tangible item... [;] nothing was removed from someone's possession"). See, 
also, Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair use and market failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. 
Rev. 975 (2002), at 979. 
44 Whenever a resource distribution is Pareto optimal, no other allocation of resources 
would benefit at least one person without imposing a cost on someone else. See R. 
Leftwich, The price system and resource allocation 284-85, 298, 388-89 (5th ed. 1973). 
45 Bruce A. Ackerman, Introduction to Economic foundations of property law, (B. 
Ackerman ed. 1975), at xiii. 
46 See, Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., supra note 43, at 979, referring to Bruce Sterling, The 
Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier 250-81 (1992). 
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state laws, the theft of a CD would in all probability be valued at the market 
price for the CD, not at the worth of the intangible rights to reproduction 
that copyright protects.47 As argued herein, it is however not the role of 
copyright law to make this normative choice whenever Pareto superiority is 
present. That does not mean that distribution is inefficient or that it is bad 
law – just that copyright is not the proper set of laws to promote distributive 
justice.48 
Another explanation or at least manifestation against the libertarian taking 
on distributive justice in copyright law may be related to the intriguing 
change in American public opinion in favor of file sharing norm.49 With 
members of the general public and the recording community upset with the 
RIAA's actions, public pressure largely views downloading as morally 
legitimate.50 Thus, while the recording industry clearly perceives music 
downloading as illegal, "[s]ome do not even seem to see any real moral ... 
[or] ethical ... dilemma with media piracy over the Internet".51 Instead, "the 
image is out there of the bully ganging up on people with the least amount 
of money, the rich taking from the poor."52 Through the recognition of the 
potential of new technologies to facilitate inexpensive speech and the 
attendant danger of burdening those technologies with extra expenses, 
Courts may have been partly catalyzing this jurisprudential dangle even 
indirectly. Sympathy to the role of poorly-financed speakers can already be 
found in the constituting case of Reno v. ACLU, where the court noted 
“[The Internet] provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for 
communication of all kinds…Through the use of Web pages, mail 
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a 
pamphleteer.”53 And yet, as this essay argues, copyright jurisprudence was 
 
47 Id.
48 See discussion at part B.3, infra. 
49 See, Stacey M. Lantagne, The morality of MP3s: The failure of the recording 
industry’s plan of attack, 18 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 269 (2004). See, also, discussion 
herein. 
50 See, Amanda Lenhart & Susannah Fox, Pew Internet & American life project, 
downloading free music: Internet music lovers don’t think it’s stealing 2 (Sept. 28, 
2000), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_ Music_Report2.pdf 
(Last visited 1 December 2005) (observing that approximately 80% of music 
downloaders do not consider what they are doing to be a form of stealing). Id.
51 See also John Hale, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, & 
Intellectual Property, Committee on House Judiciary, Feb. 26, 2003 (testimony); See, 
also, e.g., Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Tone Deaf to a Moral Dilemma? Millions 
Download Songs Illegally But Don't Feel Guilty, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 2003, at A1. 
52 See, Anthony Prapkanis, a University of California-Santa Cruz professor of social 
psychology, at Jefferson Graham, RIAA Lawsuits Bring Consternation and Chaos, 
USATODAY.com, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http:// 
www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-09-10-riaasuit-reax_x.htm (Last visited 
1 December 2005). 
53 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see generally, Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it 
will Do, 104 Yale L.J. 1805 (1995). 
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not designed to succumb to the present sway of libertarian argumentation, as 
copyright law intrinsically was not designed and is inefficient in promoting 
distributive justice by favoring the poor and thus penalizing the wealthy.  
 
2. Well-being theory: Beyond basic needs  
 
A second claim on the account of distributive justice comes from the liberal 
approach, upholding that basic property rights, established by principles of 
acquisition and transfer, should be inviolate.54 Inequalities in such basic 
goods such as health, nutrition, shelter and education, therefore, cannot be 
justified through efficiency.55 In other words, inequalities in the latter type 
of goods cannot be justified as maximizing the total amount of welfare. In 
such cases alone, the concern for the well-being of other people based on 
their basic needs is the responsibility of the government, to be achieved via 
its tax and transfer payment mechanisms.56 Disappointing to some, next to 
concerns about inequality as a moral adversity, welfare herein also has been 
perceived as a mean to curtail violence by welfare recipients.57 
In contrast, individuals utilizing their private property are not required to 
treat others with care or concern.58 Only such a "division of labor" can 
promote distributive justice without unduly undermining individual 
liberty.59 In other words, well being theories of fairness morally uphold only 
 
54 F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 93-102, 133-61 (1961). Buchanan, Political 
Equality and Private Property: The Distributional Paradox, In Markets and Morals 69-
84 (G. Dworkin, G. Bennet, & P. Brown eds. 1977); Epstein, supra note 38, 293-94 
(1975).  
55 See David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 224 (1989), at 272; 
James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance 8 
(1986), at 299-300. As Daphna Lewinson-Zamir in her seminal paper concludes, the 
necessity to protect property is, thus, most obvious with regard to the values of 
autonomy and liberty. Daphna Lewinson-Zamir, supra note 25, at 1715. But see, 
Daphna Lewinson-Zamir, at 1716, applying her objective well-being theory on 
property law, based on the Maslowian Pyramid of needs, expanding the scope of 
protection also to “the acquisition of knowledge necessary for appreciating the good 
things in life”, “adopting worthwhile goals”, or realizing one’s potential. Daphna 
Lewinson-Zamir, Id., referring also to Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and 
Personality 35-58, 97-98 (2d ed. 1970). 
56 John Rawls, a Theory of Justice 87-88, 90-95, 274-70 (1971); Grey, Property and 
Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 877, 
890 n.38 (1976); John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Utilitarianism and 
Beyond, at 159; John Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, In Values and Morals 47, 
54-55 (A. Golman & J. Kim eds. 1987). See also, C. Fried, Right and Wrong 143-50 
(1978). 
57 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
306-08, 314-24 (1985), at 315-16; Frances F. Piven & Richard Cloward, Regulating 
the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (2d ed. 1993) (adding that U.S. welfare 
policies expand during times of civil instability so as to pacify social unrest). 
58 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire ch. 8 (1986). 
59 Id, ch. 8 (1986), at 299-301. 
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compulsory redistribution of 'primary goods' rather than vague 'individual 
well-being' attributed, such as enjoyment or pleasure per se. Such enjoyment 
also drives the vast majority of internet users who download copyrighted 
digital works of art. Such less-than-basic needs do not justify, thought, 
government intervention or the adoption of a new interpretative paradigm 
for digital copyright law. Liberal democratic societies, arguably, should be 
able to agree that the economic status of Internet users that download digital 
music, or that of potential artists and amateurs, by no means correspond 
with the basic needs that well being theories initially are said to augment. 
 
To be sure, Common law is not unfamiliar with this liberal notion and in 
fact promoting ideals of distributive justice traditionally have been 
exclusively confined to those fields of law that are specifically designed for 
fostering these ideals, such as tax law, welfare law, but then also some more 
trivial segments of copyright law. 
 
The Copyright Act of 1976 thus includes a variety of narrowly chosen 
exceptions specifically designed to help parties sheltered from the inclusive 
impact of copyright including the blind, handicapped, or disabled persons;60 
nonprofit educational institutions;61 religious organizations;62 and other 
nonprofit groups, such as “nonprofit agricultural or horticultural 
organization[s],” “nonprofit veterans’ organization[s],” or ‘nonprofit 
fraternal organization[s].”63 And yet, these copyright’s burdens are strictly 
limited by various exceptions for specified classes of users who might not 
otherwise be able to bear copyright-related expenses. In these narrow 
categories copyright law indeed resembles exceptions favored by income tax 
legislation.64 Even when the Copyright Act goes to include a provision that 
permits live performance of musical works and non-dramatic literary works, 
it does so narrowly, and as long as the performance does not have a 
commercial purpose, the performers are not paid, and no admission fee is 
 
60 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(8)-(9) (excusing certain performances specifically designed for 
and directed to blind or other handicapped persons); id. § 121 (excusing certain 
reproductions or distributions of nondramatic literary works for use by blind or other 
disabled persons). 
61 See id. § 110(1) (West Supp. 2003) (excusing certain performances or displays by 
nonprofit educational institutions). See also id. § 107(1) (referring to "nonprofit 
educational purposes" in defining the scope of the fair use defense); id. § 108 (excusing 
certain reproductions by libraries or archives). 
62 See id. § 110(3) (excusing certain performances or displays "in the course of services at 
a place of worship or other religious assembly"). 
63 See id. § 110(6) (excusing certain performances by nonprofit agricultural groups); id. § 
110(10) (excusing certain performances by nonprofit veterans' or fraternal 
organizations). 
64 See, the Income tax code 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (West Supp. 2003) (providing tax credits 
for permanently and totally disabled persons); id. §§ 501-39 (providing tax exemption 
for certain organizations). 
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charged.65 Again, as the Copyrights Act’s legislative history suggests, the 
latter provision, for example, was designed to benefit predominantly poor 
creators who could not otherwise afford to perform copyrighted works.66 
Patent law jurisprudence tells of a similar taking on distributive justice.67 
The market for pharmaceutical products particularly sets the proper analogy, 
where the availability of intellectual property is an issue of life and death, 
not merely of dollars and cents.68 In accordance, the main critique against 
the pharmaceutical patents regime is that poor patients cannot equally afford 
pharmaceuticals that have already been developed and could be produced at 
low marginal cost.69 
In that sense, copyright law considerations of narrowly defined generic 
components of distributive justice not only ought to be taken into account in 
designing rules for exchange, but must be taken into account if the law of 
copyright is to have the necessary degree of minimum moral acceptability. 
The scholarly incongruity about the interpretative recognition of distributive 
justice concerns should only begin where these narrowly chosen generic 
exemptions end to help consumers who are most in need of assistance.70 
Within the context of copyright, outside the narrow scope of listed 
exceptions, high entry barriers on access to copyright are marginal, as 
copyrighted works can be largely purchased in low prices and generally are 
subject to mass consumption.71 
The necessity of property to the realization of well-being obviously creates a 
quantity requirement: A certain minimum amount of property is necessary 
for people to be able to fare even modestly well. Subject to carefully tailored 
exceptions, copyright law however, offers a higher monetary benchmark. 
Thus, rules that aim at insuring people a minimal amount of property 
presumably tend to increase basic well-being. And yet, simply put, 
 
65 17 U.S.C §110(4). If there is an admission charge, such performances are still 
permitted so long as the proceeds above costs are only used for educational, religious, 
or charitable purposes, and so long as the copyright holder does not object via 
procedures specified in the statute. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)(B). 
66 The exception was broader under the 1909 Copyright Act, which exempted all 
performances that were not “for profit”. The 1976 House Report explains that the old 
exemption was too broad because “[m]any ‘non-profit’ organizations are highly 
subsidized and capable of paying royalties.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976), at 62. 
Presumably, then, the narrow exemption is intended to allow performances by poorly-
financed groups that would be unable to afford the fees required to perform the works 
of their choice. 
67 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 68 
(2002); For the pharmaceutical context, see, also, Arti K. Rai, The Information 
Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and 
Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 173 (2001) 
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 18, at 105 & Fn. 233-235 and accompanying text. 
70 Id, at 70. 
71 For further critique, see, also discussion in Part D.2, herein. 
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copyright law largely should not be interpreted in that rather fashionable 
manner, or at least mannered in that fashion. 
 
3) Welfare economics: Beyond Kaldor-Hicksian aptitude  
 
A third account against distributive justice within property law and more 
specifically copyright law emerged through the law-and-economics school 
of thought. This third approach is also the focal point of this essay. It argues 
that there are sound reasons for much normative economic analysis of law 
not to take explicit account of the distribution of earnings within copyright 
jurisprudence.72 In copyright one can avoid the question of the fairness of 
the starting point simply by asserting that areas of law other than copyright 
are better designed to take care of distributive questions of fairness or 
justness.73 As we have stressed, these reasons derive from judgments about 
the best ways to organize analysis and to accomplish distributive objectives, 
not from a belief that distributive concerns lack normative importance.74 
Within the economical discourse, it is widely agreed that redistribution goals 
can be accomplished better in modern states by tax law,75 etc., and not the 
reshuffling of property rights.76 Cost-benefit analysis aimed at maximizing 
welfare, therefore, does not contend against distributive goals.77 However, 
 
72 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient 
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23(2) J. Legal Stud. 667 (supp. vol. 
1994) (hereinafter, ‘Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System’); A. Mitchell Polinsky, 
An Introduction to Law and Economics (2d ed. 1989), at 124-27; Steven Shavell, A 
Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should 
Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414 
(1981). 
73 Cf. Id. But see, See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. 
Legal Stud. 413 (1992) (using law and economics analysis while implicitly assuming 
that taxes are not available for redistributive purposes). 
74 Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus welfare, at 995. 
75 The U.S. tax system redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the federal government. See 
generally, Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-9833 (West Supp. 2002); Treasury 
Regulations for I.R.C., 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.0-1 to 801.6 (2003). Particularly see, Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-1564 (West Supp. 2003) (income taxes); id. §§ 2001-
2704 (2002) (estate and gift taxes); id. §§ 4001-5000 (miscellaneous excise taxes); id. 
§§ 5001-5881 (alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes). Many economists 
writing in the field of public economics study the distributive effects of taxation and 
other government policy. See, e.g., William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 
(1947); James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income 
Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971); Matti Tuomala, Optimal Income Tax and 
Redistribution (1990). For the regulatory framework, see 
76 See, e.g., Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff ch. 4 (1975); R. 
Posner, Economics Analysis of Law 10 (2d ed. 1977). 
77 See, Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A Companion to 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 311 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996), at 330; 
Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 592, 594 (1985). There are a number of explanations for the common 
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in compliance with the prevailing economics copyright paradigm, copyright 
should avoid promoting distributive means. To be sure, the term 
“distribution” herein refers to concerns about the overall allocation of 
income or wealth--that is, about economic equality and inequality.78 
Thus, the alternative disregard of the distributional dimension of any given 
predicament is attributing of the entire law-and-economics school of thought 
and is conceptually flawed.79 Welfare economics, as will be explained 
herein, is not concerned with distribution in this situational sense per se.80 
Changing how a loss is divided between the two parties, hence, is of no 
consequence under welfare economics.81 
To be sure, the issue of the appropriate criterion of well-being of users of 
copyrighted works and their creators alike, used in evaluating welfare and in 
welfare maximization, is distinct from the "fairness" paradigm largely 
advocated by copyright fairness scholars, which concerns the appropriate 
distribution of well-being--be it measured by subjective82 or objective83 
standards--among individuals. In other words, the economic notion of 
fairness is one that is concerned unequivocally with the distribution of 
income. Welfare economics thus accommodates all factors that are relevant 
to individuals' well-being and to its distribution. 84 
belief that income distribution is unimportant in normative economic analysis of law. 
For further discussion, see D.1, infra.  
78 However, concerns regarding who is supposed to overcome in a particular legal dispute 
are also often described as distributive. In such contexts, the word "distributive" refers 
to the allocation of a particular loss linking the disputing parties (rather than to the 
degree of disproportion in the allotment of earnings in the general public), and the 
apposite distribution is understood to be determined by notions of fairness such as 
corrective justice (instead of by a conception of the appropriate allotment of earnings in 
the general public). See, Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus welfare, supra note 23, at 
998. 
79 Id.
80 Indirectly, however, changing the division of losses between parties to disputes may 
often affect individuals' well-being in a number of respects. Kaplow and Shavell, 
Fairness versus welfare, supra note 23, at 998. See, also, discussion herein. 
81 Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus welfare, supra note 23, at 998. 
82 Brink, David O. Brink, supra note 55, at 217; Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus 
welfare, supra note 23, at 1350. 
83 Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 23, at 980 n.35, 1353-54 
(2001); Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism 23-24, 37-44 (1993), at 55-60. 
84 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 23, at 968. On 
welfare economics, see, generally, Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual 
Values (1951); John C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in 
Games and Social Situations ch. 4 (1977). For references on applied welfare 
economics, see Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics (1984); I.M.D. 
Little & J.A. Mirrlees, Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries 
(1974); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II ch. 19 (1989). 
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With definite reference to copyright law, arguably, the appropriate analytical 
framework should comply with the latter, so that beyond generic 
redistribution of copyright to the needy, copyright law should then use the 
tax-and-transfer system to achieve distributive fairness or justice.85 In 
economics terms, as Jehle provided, appropriate conditions hold, “Any 
Pareto optimal allocation can be supported by competitive markets and 
some distribution of initial endowments.”86 To be sure, welfare economics, 
hence, does not support the Kaldor-Hicks framework.87 One implication of 
the fact that welfare economics incorporates consideration of the distribution 
of income is that the well-known opposition regarding the looming 
conceptual indeterminacy of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test is badly 
chosen.88 Under a common understanding of this latter normative paradigm, 
copyrights are assessed by reference to wealth maximization or efficiency, 
criteria that many take to mean as omitting imperative characteristics of 
individuals' well-being and as taking no notice of distributive concerns.89 
A welfare economics understanding of copyright ultimately, arguably, will 
chill the tension between market-driven economies of equality and the 
assortment of forms of intervening with market outcomes through fairness.90 
85 See e.g., Steven Shavell, A Note of efficiency v. Distributional Equity in Legal 
Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 
71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414 (1981); and Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra 
note 72, at 667 (1994). 
86 G. A. Jehle, Advanced microeconi\omics theory (1991), at 232. See, also, G. Debreu, 
Theory of value (Yale University Press, 1959). For seminal work on welfare 
economics, see Kenneth J. Arrow, supra note 84; John C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior 
and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations ch. 4 (1977). On  applied 
welfare economics, see also, Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics 
(1984); Yew-Kwang Ng, Efficiency, Equality and Public Policy: With a Case for 
Higher Public Spending (2000); Yew-Kwang Ng, Welfare Economics: Introduction 
and Development of Basic Concepts (1979); 
87 Kaldor-Hicks effieiency is also called 'potential Pareto optimality' because it assumes 
that a move that is Kaldor-Hicks superior can be transformed into a Pareto superior 
move by forcing the gainers from the move to compensate the losers. See Kaldor, 
Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 
ECON. J. 549, 549-50 (1939). For a discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a tool of 
legal policymaking, see Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, supra note 16, at 513, 519- 20; 
Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 591, 594, 634-39 (1980). 
88 Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, at 995-996 and Fn. 53, referring to Jon 
D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, supra note 77, at 311, 330 (observing that "[p]erhaps the 
most common criticism of law and economics is that it overlooks or, worse, displaces 
questions of distribution or equity" and asserting that "[e]conomists respond in part by 
observing that distributional questions taken by themselves fall outside the reach of 
economic science"); Laurence H. Tribe, supra note 77, at 592, 594 ("This disregard of 
the distributional dimension of any given problem is characteristic of the entire law-
and-economics school of thought ...."). 
89 Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 23, at 968. 
90 William D.A. Bryant, Misinterpretations of the second fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics: Barriers to better economic education, The Journal of Economic Education, 
Vo. 25, No. 1 (Winter, 1994), 75-80, at 75. See, also, discussion in Part D, infra. 
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In conclusion, it may be inefficient to choose an inefficient policy in order 
to promote the desired distribution of individual welfare. Copyright which is 
not specifically designed for redistribution, thus, should avoid promoting 
distributive means beyond trivial segments of copyright law. 
 
C.  Classes of Copyright Distributive Injustice 
 
1.  Overview 
 
Whenever there is in fact a conflict depends on the specific distributional 
consequences of pursuing efficiency and on what constitutes an equitable 
distribution of income.91 Present day P2P Internet public concern and 
litigation, in fact, sets aside what seem to be three leading classes of 
distributive injustice that have emerged, referring to claims favoring 1) the 
enriching of poor infringers, 2) the enriching of poor creators and 3) the 
impoverishing of wealthy copyright industries. It may be inefficient to 
choose an inefficient policy in order to promote the desired distribution of 
income. Nonetheless, this essay will try to argue why the choice of the three 
classes herein to promote redistribution should be based primarily on 
efficiency considerations. This is true, yet again, regardless of the specific 
distributional consequences of pursuing efficiency in these particular cases 
and regardless of what constitutes an equitable distribution of income. In 
these three contexts, as argued herein, it is detrimental to formally 
incorporate into copyright jurisprudence the nowadays rather schmaltzy 
egalitarian commitment, given that the constitutional taking on copyright-
tailored redistribution is paradigmatically only an offshoot, albeit judicious. 
2. Enriching poor infringers 
 
Arguments in favor of distributive justice within the P2P context already 
expands to financial, professional, social, and even marital statuses. 
Reference to age, sex or health conditions are also customarily mentioned. 
To illustrate, on behalf of copyright fairness, public opinion has been made 
informed that among the alleged unlawful copyright file-sharing copyright 
infringers aged as minors or as the elderly, such as a twelve-year-old girl,92 a 
 
91 A. Mitchell Polinsky, supra note 72, at 9. 
92 See, Downloading girls escapes Lawsuit, CBSNews.com (Sept. 9, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/tech/main570507.shtml (Last visited 1 
December 2005). See, also, Geoffrey Neri, Sticky fingers or sticky norms? 
Unauthorized music downloading and unsettled social norms, 3 Geo. L. J. 733, at 752; 
Jason Schultz, File Sharing Must Be Made Legal: Suing 12-year-olds and 
Grandmothers Isn't the Answer. There's Got To Be a Better Way, Electronic Frontier 
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sixty-six-year-old retired school teacher,93 a seventy-year-old grandfather,94 
and an eighty-six-year-old grandmother.95 The public further became 
informed of defendants' unfortunate health conditions describing some as 
dyslexic96 or simply shocked97 by the allegation.98 By the same token, the 
public was made aware of the fact that a single mother had to bare the 
expenses of a settlement for her minor daughter’s accusations.99 With this 
egalitarian avalanche mounting, it was just a circumstantial matter until even 
an all-purpose self-employed businessman defendant in a copyright lawsuit 
stemming from an RIAA subpoena would be described as yet another 'social 
victim'.100 Referring once again to copyright fairness rhetoric, describing 
him as financially vulnerable, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a 
most influential American Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) who 
took on the case, stated "[i]t's not fair to hold people like Mr. Plank as 
collateral damage in the RIAA dragnet."101 
3. Enriching poor creators 
 
Poorly-financed creators serve as a second class of individuals who 
copyright fairness advocates argue, suffer from a heavier burden of 
copyright on creativity.102 Digital music sampling, or shortly sampling, is a 
 
Foundation, at http:// www.eff.org/share/20030912_jason_salon.php (Sept. 12, 2003) 
(Last visited 1 December 2005).  
93 John Schwartz, She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either, New York 
Times, Sept. 25, 2003, at C1, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2003/09/25/business/media (Last visited 1 December 2005). 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. See, also, Chris Gaither, Recording Industry Withdraws Suit Mistaken Identity 
Raises Questions on Legal Strategy, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 2003, at C1, available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/20032/09/24 (Last visited 1 December 2005). 
The case was finally dropped, but not with prejudice. Id. 
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Downloading girls escapes Lawsuit, CBSNews.com (Sept. 9, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/tech/main570507.shtml (Last visited 1 
December 2005). 
100 Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Frontier Foundation Defends 
Alleged Filesharer (Oct. 14, 2003), at www.eff.org/IP/P2P/20031014_eff_pr.php. (Last 
visited 1 December 2005). See generally Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 2-3, 
Fanovisa, Inc. v. Ross Plank, (No. CV03-6371 DT (FMOx)) (complaint filed by 
Fanovisa, BMG Music and Warner Bros. Records, Inc. alleging that Ross Plank has 
used, and continues to use, an online media distribution system to download, distribute, 
and/or make available copyrighted material(s) to others for distribution). 
101 Id. (quoting Wendy Seltzer, staff attorney with Electronic Frontier Foundation). 
Notwithstanding, the case was dropped. 
102 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital speech and democratic culture, 79 N.Y.U L. Rev. 1, 
6-13 (2004); Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and how) fairness matters 
at the IP/Antitrust interface, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1817 (2003); See, also, See A & M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912-17 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
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new creature of technology in the music industry. As described in the 
Napster case, the use of sampling occurs when users download one of the 
plaintiffs' works to decide whether to purchase the audio CD.103 This passive 
usage of music samples is different than one mostly used by a studio sound 
engineer at the direction of a studio producer or recording artist to recycle 
sound fragments originally recorded by other musicians.104 To be sure, in 
the latter, a sampling artist will take a previously popular song, refine it with 
a more modern sound through sophisticated engineering, and repeat it 
throughout a new version of the song.105 
The latter form of sampling has also been cautiously licensed in safeguard 
of creators’ proprietary rights overcoming impending claims in favor of 
would-be poorly-financed creators. A user who desires to make a legalized 
sampled recording must get hold of the proper licenses and pay the original 
artist statutory fees for the recording. For the reason that this separate form 
of sampling involves the use of both an underlying music composition as 
well as the sound recording of it, there are two distinct licensing processes 
involved--one for music compositions and the other for sound recordings.106 
These licenses are typically negotiated for and in due course owned 
exclusively by an artist's record company. The appropriate procedure is for 
the sampling artist to seek licenses for the use of previously recorded 
copyrighted works prior to the release of any work in which the sampling 
technique is used.107 
It took the former and second type of sampling practice used for sales 
promotional purposes, distinctive of file sharing technologies, to enhance 
distributive justice argumentation from anew. Court findings, however, 
show that the small portion of Napster use of new artists, based on what was 
named the ‘New Artists program,’ was merely used as a smokescreen. In 
fact, it was not central to defendant's business strategy until this action made 
it convenient. New or unsigned artists were said to promote their works and 
 
(summarizing defenses emphasizing use of Napster technology for "sampling” music 
files).  
103 See, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 
at 1018. 
104 See Comment, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 California 
Law Review 421 (1988); 26 AMJUR POF 3d 537, § 2. 
105 Comment, Look What They've Done to my Song Ma--Digital Sampling in the 90's: A 
Legal Challenge for the Music Industry, 9 University of Miami Entertainment and 
Sports Law Review 179 (1992) citing Note, You Can't Always Get What You Want 
but Digital Sampling Can Get What You Need!, 22 Akron Law Review 691 (1989); 
see also Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay, 105 Harvard Law 
Review 726 (1992); Comment, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: 
Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 Columbia Law Review 
1723 (1987). 
106 See Comment, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 California 
Law Review 421 (1988); 26 AMJUR POF 3d 537, § 2. 
107 Id.
COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE 
 
21
distribute them in MP3 format via the Napster service.108 Earlier on, 
Napster, Inc. indeed has sought business alliances and developed both 
Internet- and software-based technologies to support its New Artist 
Program.109 Soon after, as was proven by the Napster court, Napster merely 
used those unknown artists that it used to seek, as a basis for protection 
against infringement of the famous artists whose music they were making 
available or providing access to.110 Moreover, a sampling of 1,150 music 
files showed that only eleven were those of new artists.111 The Napster court 
affirmed the district court's finding that sampling cannot constitute a fair use 
for several reasons all relating to the fact that sampling is commercial in 
nature.112 Even though it increased CD sales, Court ultimately held that 
increased sales of copyrighted material attributable to unlawful use ought 
not to divest the copyright holder of the right to license the material.113 
Support for poorly-financed creators came also in newly supported sub-class 
of communicators, in the face of unauthorized amateur authorship, who 
traditionally have not been spared copyright’s burdens. P2P technology thus 
freely enables unknown and not sponsored amateurs to become large-scale 
producers and distributors of creative work. Amateurs and amateur 
creativity, copyright fairness advocates argue, are yet another sub-class of 
cases where distributive justice should benefit.114 Before the information 
age, the technologies of publishing were expensive.115 That meant the vast 
majority of publishing was commercial and commercial entities could bear 
the costs associated with copyright law.116 The current system, instead, 
requires amateurs to bear the costs associated with finding the rights holder, 
negotiating, and making royalty payments. And yet, as copyright fairness 
 
108 See Krause Dec. ¶¶ 8-15. 
109 See Parker Dec. ¶ 6. 
110 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1009483 at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 
2000) (transcript of proceedings). See, also, an email indicating that defendant planned 
to solicit interest among unsigned artists, containing a cryptic statement regarding the 
creation of indexes listing available MP3s: "For now, we should do this for 
UNSIGNED artists only so the RIAA thinks we are not infringing on copyright." 
Parker Dec., Exh. B. Id, at 904 Fn. 8. An early version of the Napster website 
advertised the ease with which users could find their favorite popular music without 
"wading through page after page of unknown artists." 1 Frackman Dec., Exh. C (Parker 
Dep.) at 104:16-105:10, Exh. 235. 
111 See, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F.Supp.2d 896 N.D.Cal., 2000, at 904. 
112 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001), at 1018. 
113 Id., at 1018. 
114 Hunter and Lastowka, supra note 11, at 988; See, also, Jessica Litman, Copyright 
Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 
& POL. 237, 251 (1996). at 237; Shaffer Von Houweling, supra note 23, at 33; 
Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 
Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 651 (1997), at 651. 
115 See, Free culture: How big media uses technology and the law to lock down and 
control creativity 85-94 (2004), available at www.free.culture.cc/freeculture.pdf, at 19. 
(Last visited 1 December 2005). 
116 Id. 
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scholars advocate, amateurs are generally not voluntarily willing to bear 
these costs, and amateur creativity thus is often lost.117 And yet, in the 
Internet P2P network environment, the amateur sphere arguably enjoys state 
of the art technology that only increases their traditional copyright law 
incentives; way more than the previously provided incentives protected by 
the mechanisms of copyright law that predate the information age.  
 
To be sure, the Copyright Act's primary objective is to encourage the 
production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the public 
good. The fairness argument that the promotion of the public good per se 
best serves the Copyright Act's policy expresses a one-sided view of the 
Copyright Act's purposes. In Wheaton v. Peters,118 a case involving a 
challenge to a secondary work as violative of an alleged common law 
copyright, the Supreme Court made it clear that copyright is strictly a 
creature of statute and is neither a common law property right nor a natural 
right of the author.119 Copyright law, thus should not be adapted to better 
facilitate the particular benefits that amateur content production provides 
given that amateur incentives to create evidently increased. Wheaton's 
description of copyright protection as a monopoly in derogation of the rights 
of the public has become a basic reasoned premise of subsequent copyright 
legislation and decisions. Since Wheaton, the Supreme Court has time and 
again reaffirmed the standard that "[t]he copyright law…makes reward to 
the owner a secondary consideration."120 Court accordingly has made it 
clear that it is peculiarly important that the law's boundaries be demarcated 
as clearly as possible.121 
With the increase in dissemination technology that facilitates amateurs in 
becoming large-scale producers and distributors of their creative work - 
there seem to be no independent justification in support for poorly-financed 
amateurs or new artists per se, based on copyright-tailored distributive 
justice claims. 
 
117 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Free culture: How big media uses technology and the law 
to lock down and control creativity 85-94 (2004), available at 
www.free.culture.cc/freeculture.pdf, at 95-97 (Last visited 1 December 2005).; Hunter 
and Lastowka, supra note 11, at 958. 
118 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) 
119 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 362 (1908); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) ("copyright property under the Federal law is wholly 
statutory, and depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress ...."); 
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907) ("In this country it 
is well settled that property in copyright is the creation of the Federal statute ...."); 
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85-86 (1899); Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 
(1889); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 252 (1888); 
120 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (emphasis added). 
121 See, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, U.S.Cal.,1994, at 517-518. 
COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE 
 
23
4. Impoverishing wealthy copyright industries 
 
Copyright fairness scholars traditionally advocate against the concentration 
of media ownership, as such that may lead to the disproportionate power of 
wealthy speakers and audiences.122 These concentrations of power 
traditionally are said to have determined the mix of speech that comprises 
public discourse.123 Public opinion as well, has largely supported the view 
that the copyright industries are largely monopolistic.124 Anthony Prapkanis, 
a University of California-Santa Cruz professor of social psychology, 
summed this view, commenting that while people may be sympathetic to the 
music industry's plight, "the image is out there of the bully ganging up on 
people with the least amount of money, the rich taking from the poor."125 
Lately, within the P2P context, Napster, not surprisingly, used the same 
antitrust-like terminology, asserting that RIAA members had expanded their 
monopoly beyond the permissible scope under the law.126 
The record industry indeed has constantly been concerned with problems of 
monopoly power and pricing, which are quintessentially economic 
problems. To be sure, the extent to which monopoly power is present in any 
particular case is an empirical question.127 And yet, at no point, was the 
record industry lawfully found to be monopolistic within its meaning with 
the United States' antitrust laws.  
122 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of 
Free Expression, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1879, 1884 (2000); Dan Hunter and F. Gregory 
Lastowka, Amateur-to-amateur, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 951 (2004), at 1017-1018, 
referring to See, e.g., William Gibson, "Digital Day", Address to Directors Guild of 
America, Los Angeles (May 17, 2003), available at: 
www.williamgibsonbooks.com/archive/2003_05_01_archive.asp#200322370 (Last 
visited 1 December 2005). But see, Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A 
Cautionary Note, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1933 (2000). 
123 Netanel, supra note 122, at 1884; Hunter and Lastowka, supra note 11, at 1017. 
124 Sam Diaz, Labels' actions overshadow their message, observers say. San Jose Mercury 
News (Sept. 15, 2003), available at http:// 
www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/6775671.htm (Last visited 1 
December 2005) ("And suddenly, the trade association [RIAA]--in its effort to squelch 
illegal music sharing over P2P networks such as Kazaa and Grokster--looked more like 
a schoolyard bully."); Jefferson Graham, RIAA lawsuits bring consternation, chaos. 
USA Today (Sep. 10, 2003), available at http:// 
www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-09-10-riaa-suit-reax_x.htm: (Last 
visited 1 December 2005). 
125 Id. See, also, "Are they taking a PR hit?" asks Lee Kovel, of L.A.-based Kovel/Fuller 
ad agency. "Of course. Massive. I think they asked, 'What's the pain vs. the reward?' 
They want to make a statement and strike fear. They don't care about PR." See 
generally http://www.boycott-riaa.com/ (Last visited 1 December 2005). 
126 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912, at 922. 
127 See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 
265 (1977), at 31. 
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What is more, is that even if copyright fairness advocates would assert that 
the antitrust track has not been exhausted, it would have been until that 
point, inefficient to adjust market dominance through 'non-economic' 
antitrust goals to reflect the concern for monopoly in less-than-a legal 
concern. The reason being it that overriding economic goal of the antitrust 
laws is strictly to maximize consumer welfare through the efficient 
allocation of resources.128 In accordance, antitrust precedents generally 
prefer the economic goals and that accommodating non-economic goals 
generally confuses antitrust jurisprudence and subverts its basic purposes.129 
In other words, the use of antitrust laws provides the optimal degree of 
market performance, whenever in need in distinction from the resent state of 
affairs within copyright law.  
Furthermore, imposition of redistributive methods through copyright law 
would necessitate to fully equaling efficient market reconstruction to the 
harm caused by anti-competitive practices that unmistakably did not led 
courts to formally proclaim the record industry as unlawfully monopolistic. 
Thus, any adjustment in copyright law due to parties’ anti-competitive 
practices, as evidenced by their wealth, must be premised on a failure in 
applying antitrust laws to begin with. In any event, it is needless to say, the 
balance between incentive and restriction even while reviewing the record 
industry's commercial penchants should not be always considered evenly. 
Instead, any particular book, movie, or invention is likely to face 
competition from other books, movies, or inventions which are near but not 
necessarily perfect substitutes.130 
Furthermore, such distributive battles arguably, should not be designed to 
promote the well-being of private parties or specific categories of people, in 
the first place. Neither should they be connected to ends that result in 
advancing a sectored societal goal or the creation of another market to 
explore. Thus, there may be, at times, a lack of understanding among 
fairness scholars of what, given the present constitutional copyright 
framework, distributive justice is most efficient in promoting. Distributive 
justice typically does not apply between markets but within market players. 
The constituting decision in the Sony case, particularly, was made according 
to this notion. Thus it is said to have permitted the company to continue 
making and selling the VCR and excluded the motion picture studios from 
exploiting the home use of its copyrighted material for time shifting 
purposes. And yet, as a matter of a fact, the Sony decision did not exclude 
the motion picture studios from the home videotaping market. The 
dissemination of the VCR that the case facilitated created another market for 
 
128 1 P. Areeda and D. Turner, Antitrust law (1978), at 103, 111-113; R. Posner, The 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 933-34 (1979). 
129 Id. p 104. 
130 See, e.g., Edmund Kitch, supra note 127, at 31. 
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the studios to exploit. The decision, finally, ensured that Sony could profit 
from its invention while providing minimum harm to the copyright owner 
and other sectored markets at large. Any former application of distributive 
justice ultimately is done on the expense of a given public and diminishes its 
size,131 without that being the purpose of the incentive paradigm of 
copyright law to begin with. Instead, an examination of the history of 
copyright and of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution clearly reveals 
that copyright ultimately exists for the benefit of the public welfare, by 
promoting individual creators.132 Thus, its goal should not be in advancing 
sectored societal goals or distinct markets unjustly. 
D.   Rationales against Copyright Distributive Justice 
1. Distribution discriminates  
 
The income tax and welfare system arguably can redistribute from the rich 
to the poor, whereas copyright law has substantively less redistributing 
potential. Any particularization of copyright rules based on the reliance on 
the fair use liability rules analysis,133 but even a property rules analysis 
based on excludable rights on behalf of distributive justice claims would 
affect only relatively small fractions of the population and ordinarily 
constitute relatively crude means of redistribution.134 An additional 
consideration is in deciding whether to use the copyright system to promote 
distributional justice to all copyright injurers on both the substantive rule of 
law and its remedial corollaries.  
 
To begin with, substantive copyright law, it is argued, will not be able to 
redistribute the value of the proprietary rights it defends systematically 
unless the status of the parties in a certain type of dispute corresponds 
closely to the groups between which redistribution is desired.135 To be sure, 
whenever the downloading of digital music involves Internet users and song 
owners, there probably is not an obvious correspondence between the 
income of a party and whether that party is an Internet user or a song owner. 
As a copyright interpretative rule of thumb, one must assume that it may be 
that higher income persons are more likely to be song owners and high-
income internet users, but certainly there are many low-income Internet 
 
131 See Ryan Littrell, Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43 
B.C. L. Rev. 193, 225-26 (2001); see also Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 
15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 249, 249-54 (1997). 
132 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 989, supra note 2, at 4 (statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights) (quoting House Comm. on the Judiciary, Copyright Law 
Revision: Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. 
Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (Committee Print 1961) (Part 1)). 
133 A. Mitchell Polinsky, supra note 72, at 125. 
134 Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus welfare, supra note 23, at 994. 
135 Compare: A. Mitchell Polinsky, supra note 72, at 125. 
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users and high-income song owners. In copyright analysis, thus, there may 
be more remote correspondence between the income of a party and whether 
that party is a victim or an infringement.  
 
Distributional justice also falls short when it applies to copyright law’s 
remedial corollaries. By and large, it certainly may be efficient for damages, 
for example, to reflect the victim’s income in some categories of legal 
disputes. That is whenever an injury involves lost future earnings, and the 
level of earnings indicates the extent of economic loss.136 As Kaplow and 
Shavell further argue, this argument assumes that injurers have some 
advance knowledge of the economic loss they might cause. In nuisance and 
pollution control disputes, for comparison, there may be a closer 
correspondence between the income of a party and whether that party is a 
victim or an injurer. To illustrate, the consumers of the production of a 
quantity of polluting industry may be mainly superior income people, while 
the victims living in close proximity to the polluting factories may be 
primarily lower income persons.137 
Thus, in some kinds of disputes, the choice of a proper rule might contribute 
towards the implementation of distributional goals dissimilarly from 
copyright law. In recent years, within intellectual property litigation certain 
courts choose to treat a financial disparity between the parties as a factor to 
be weighed in determining whether an award should issue rather than simply 
the magnitude of such an award.138 Redistribution hence has been 
accomplished by setting damages higher when the injurer is wealthy and 
lower when the injurer is poor. Again, to illustrate, in an action for 
trademark and copyright infringement, unfair competition, and conspiracy, 
the court recited the rule that such awards are not excessive as long as they 
do not ruin the defendant financially.139 Since the amounts awarded 
constituted 5% and 2.5%, respectively, of the defendants' net worth, the 
court concluded that financial ruin was unlikely to result from their 
imposition.140 
136 See, Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages 
(Working paper No. 4287, National Bureau of Economic Research 1993). 
137 A. Mitchell Polinsky, supra note 72, at 126. 
138 See Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., Nos. 98 Civ. 7128(BSJ), 
98 Civ. 7129(BSJ), & 98 Civ. 7130(BSJ), 2003 WL 1701904, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
2003); Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 94 Civ. 9144, 2000 WL 1010830, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2000) (same).  
139 In Transgo, Inc. v Ajac Transmission Parts Corp. (1985, CA9 Cal) 768 F2d 1001, 227 
USPQ 598, 82 ALR Fed 97, cert den 474 US 1059, 88 L Ed 2d 778, 106 S Ct 802, later 
proceeding on other grounds (CA9 Cal) 911 F2d 363, 15 USPQ2d 1907, 17 FR Serv 3d 
924 (applying California law as to damages).  
140 Id. See, also, Punitive damages: Relationship to defendant's wealth as factor in 
determining propriety of award, 87 A.L.R.4th 141.  
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The latter conclusion, however, is not always true, as in the case of 
copyright law. Within the scope of copyright jurisprudence such progressive 
remedies, such as punitive damages, arguably, still seems to fall short of the 
critique to the distributive rule for three main rationales. These rationales 
relate to 1) long-term implications of progressive damages, and 2) the 
resulting disparity between litigating and non-litigating parties to disputes.  
i.    Long-term implications of progressive damages 
The first is that, initially, it is questionable whether a progressive damage 
compensation regime will entail long-term egalitarian consequences, as the 
compensation regime will be reflected in the market price of subject-matter 
property at stake.141 Moreover, such a redistributive rule may induce the 
wealthy to take more care and the poor to take less care than is efficient.142 
Within the scope of copyright jurisprudence, it is impractical to support a 
rule of law that would entail the ability of copyright infringers to have that 
knowledge in the first place. Internet users that download digital music, 
primarily, should reasonably be expected to know only about the average 
losses bestowed on their victims – the song owner community.143 Similarly, 
works of art disseminated by amateurs or emerging artists should not be 
formally assimilated by law with poverty upon its social ramifications 
therein. The Copyright Act's primary objective is initially defined in average 
terms, to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical 
expression for the public good at large stretching from corporate 
competitors to famished artists. Moreover, people are more sternly impaired 
when an unambiguous property or right of usage of theirs is denied of them, 
than when a comparable charge is taken from their total wealth. According 
to the personality argument, as Lewinsohn-Zamir indicates, "people are 
more severely hurt when a certain asset of theirs is taken, than when a 
similar value is taken from their total wealth."144 A significant justification 
for why an injury to an explicit asset transcends the financial impediment 
involved derives from the distinctive function that resources play in people's 
lives, as a means of expressing their personalities.145 A copyright legal 
regime that would be responsive to this constraint should prefer the method 
of taxes and transfer payments to other ways of redistribution access to 
copyright usage. 
141 See R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 170-74 (1988). 
142 Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra note 72, at 669. 
143 See, also, discussion in Part C.1, 3 infra.  
144 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 25, at 55. 
145 Id.
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ii.   Disparity between litigants and non-litigants 
 
The second critique against distributive remedies, even when there is a close 
correspondence between the status of the parties in a certain kind of dispute 
and the groups between which redistribution is desired, legal rules still 
might not be able to achieve redistribution as systematically as an income 
tax system. This is because redistribution through the legal system only may 
occur when a dispute arises, and not all members to a given income class 
will be involved in a dispute. For example, even if the output of a polluting 
industry were consumed exclusively by rich people, not every rich person 
necessarily purchases this commodity and not every poor person lives near a 
factory in this industry. Thus, the legal rule used to control the pollution 
dispute will, at best, redistribute income from a subset of one income class 
to a subset of another.146 Moreover, even then, redistribution may be 
jumbled. A pro-plaintiff rule, such as one that supports internet users may be 
redistributive if plaintiffs, on average, are poorer than defendants, but unless 
this is unvaryingly true, the redistribution will flow in the incorrect course in 
a number of cases. The latter predicament can be avoided only if copyright 
law litigation depends in a straight line on parties’ earnings, a policy that not 
many have proposed, as described. 
 
It is thus imperative that the law's boundaries be demarcated as clearly as 
possible so that favoritism and sectored exploitations are avoided.147 The 
latter view, contentedly, has been independently promoted by courts such as 
in the Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. case, where court rightfully upheld that a 
defendant seeking to advance meritorious copyright defenses should be 
encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged 
to litigate meritorious infringement claims.148 To conclude, a rule stating 
that remedies equal average harm would be equally efficient at least within 
the scope of copyright law. 
 
146 A. Mitchell Polinsky, supra note 72, at 126. 
147 Compare: Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 25, at 54 (for the context of takings law); 
William K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 
1, 11 n.37 (1995) (same). 
148 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. supra note 121, at 517-518. see, also, In any event, 
financial disparity does not provide a basis to award attorneys' fees under the Copyright 
Act in the circumstances of this action. See Mitek Holdings, 198 F.3d at 842 (for the 
context of attorney's fees under § 505 to the Copyright Act); see also Harrison Music 
Corp. v. Tesfaye, 293 F.Supp.2d 80, 85 (D.D.C.2003) (same); Recording Industry 
Ass'n of America v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, C.A.D.C., 1981, at 165 
(wealth was irrelevant to the royalty proceeding). 
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2. Distribution is over-costly 
 
In a world with zero costs, excludable rights in copyright can be reshuffled 
to pursue distributive goals without any efficiency costs.149 In reality, 
transaction costs are positive, and reshuffling excludable rights in copyright 
for the sake of redistribution has efficiency costs.150 Thus, distribution 
arguably is a costly activity and its duplication through cumulative legal 
rules, such as copyright and tax or welfare laws is inefficient. As a result, 
next to the distortions caused by the redistribution itself, it also creates 
inefficiencies in the activities regulated by the rules that promote it.151 In 
comparison, income tax or transfer programs tend to involve less distortion 
and inefficiency than does redistribution through the legal rules.152 Such, 
hence, is the case with copyright law on several grounds, referring to 1) the 
adverse effects copyright-based redistribution has on work incentives, 2) 
their diverse administrative costs, 3) long run deriving consequences, and 4) 
differences in the frequency of intervention they require. 
 
The income tax and transfer programs tend to involve less distortion and 
inefficiency than does redistribution through legal rules. The first reason is 
that redistribution through copyright law entails the inefficiency of 
redistribution due to adverse effects on work incentives.153 As plenty of 
testimonies from within the songwriters tell, artists and songwriters, 
particularly will be severely handicap, and may even negate, the incentives 
intended by the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause—incentives which, 
together with artistic passion, keep artists at work creating music and 
investing in that creation, for the benefit of the public.154 
149 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and economics (third edition, 1999), at 111, 112 
[Hereinafter, ‘Cooter & Ulen’]. 
150 Id.
151 Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra note 72, at 667-668.  
152 Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, at 994. 
153 See, e.g., Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should 
Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 Scand. J. Econ. 264 (1979); 
Steven Shavell, supra note 72, at 414; Yew-Kwang Ng, Quasi-Pareto Social 
Improvements, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 1033 (1984); 
154 See Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 1 (2001); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 65 (1965) (testimony of Register of Copyrights Abraham Kaminstein); Brief of 
the Progress and Freedom Foundation, at: 
<ttp://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/050124-PFFgroksteramicus.pdf> (Last 
visited 1 December 2005), at 3, 4, 6, 8; See, also, legendary songwriter Mike Stoller 
and the composer “Jailhouse Rock,” Editorial, Songs That Won’t Be Written, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 7, 2000, at A15. Mike Stoller testified similarly below. See Also 
Declaration of Mike Stoller in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 
August 15, 2002, at J.A. 290, ¶¶ 11-13 (“ Today, I fear for the seventeen-year-old 
songwriter looking forward to a career in the music business. . . . If [Defendants] get 
away with their thievery, it will turn that teenager’s future livelihood into a mere 
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Moreover, taxation is more efficient than regulation through copyright 
should be understood as a claim about their comparative administrative 
costs, and notably litigation costs.155 Even if taxation is for the most part 
equally preventive of individual freedom, and has equally adverse incentive 
effects, tax schemes are by their nature easier to administer and therefore 
less costly than regulatory arrangements designed to achieve the same 
end.156 The third rationale why distribution arguably is a more costly 
activity whenever promoted through copyright law is that redistribution by 
copyright law distorts the economy more than progressive taxation in the 
long term.157 For example, if copyright law disfavors music owners, some 
rich music may switch to different professions to gain valuable legal rights. 
In contrast, a comprehensive income tax precludes people from reducing 
their tax liability by changing the source of their income.158 A fundamental 
principle of public finance is that taxes distort less when applied to a broad 
base rather than to a narrow base. Distortion drop offs with the width of the 
base because demand becomes less elastic. To illustrate, the demand for 
food is less elastic than the demand for vegetables, and the demand for 
vegetables is less elastic than the demand for carrots. Income, indeed, is 
very broad based.159 
Lastly, taxation and welfare laws are said to be less restraining of individual 
liberty. This may be understood as a claim about the frequency of 
intervention required by these substituting schemes of redistribution. While 
taxation requires only an intermittent obstruction in the lives of individuals, 
the direct regulation of transactions seems to require unremitting state 
involvement in individual affairs. An income tax is in any case less deeply 
intrusive even if the restrictions it imposes apply continuously. The reason 
for that being that taxation and welfare laws appear to be less intrusive 
because they only take money from people, leaving them free to arrange 
their affairs in the way that best realizes other, non-pecuniary ends. 
Copyright, by contrast, limits the sorts of transactions individuals, such as 
concerned song owners or even the record industry at large may arrange for 
themselves and thus seems more restrictive of personal liberty.160 Since it is 
reasonable to have a preference for a lesser amount of repeated intrusions to 
 
hobby, and, in doing so, it will ensure that fewer and fewer talented individuals can 
afford to devote their efforts to expanding America’s musical heritage.”), Id. 
155 The enforcement of legal rights requires attorneys. A plaintiff’s attorney in the United 
States routinely charges one third of the judgment. In contrast, the fee paid to an 
accountant who prepares someone’s income tax return is a small fraction of the 
person’s tax liability. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 149, at 112. 
156 Id., at 112.  
157 Compare: Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id.
160 Rawls implicitly endorses this view of regulation. See Basic Structure, supra note 9, at 
65. 
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more regular ones, this may seem a good incentive for preferring taxation 
and welfare laws as a means of redistribution. 
 
3. Distribution is imprecise 
 
It is difficult in most copyright contexts to determine just how copyright law 
could promote preferences for the poor.161 This observation, in fact, derives 
from a larger one relating legal rules at large. Copyright law, like other legal 
rules as such, hence should be based primarily on efficiency considerations 
as it cannot redistribute wealth as systematically and precisely as tax and 
welfare systems.162 The reason is that the income tax precisely targets 
inequality, whereas copyright law relies upon crude averages.163 
Following Little’s suggestion, since individuals, like internet copyright 
infringers have different tastes, the welfare they generate cannot always 
mean equal real incomes for both poor and rich infringers alike. For suppose 
that in an initial situation the equivalence did hold. Then certainly we can 
find a shift in relative prices which will make some infringers worse off and 
others better off, keeping money incomes and the general price level 
constant, so that in the second situation equal money incomes will no longer 
coincide with equal real incomes.164 In other words, according to the present 
rule of law in the United States, copyright law defends “music owners’ 
rights”. Typically music owners are richer than infringers on average then 
changing the rule of “infringers’ rights” would redistribute wealth towards 
greater equality. However, while music owners’ are richer than infringers on 
average, some infringers are undoubtedly richer than some music owners. 
Changing the rights to favor infringers over music owners will amass the 
disparity between rich and poor music owners. In contrast, progressive 
taxation will restructure uneven incomes. Internet copyright infringers, 
primarily, should reasonably be expected to know only about the average 
losses bestowed on their victims – the song owners' community. Similarly, 
works of art disseminated by amateurs or emerging artists should not be 
formally assimilated by law with poverty upon its societal upshots. 
 
161 Abramowicz, supra note 18, at 106. 
162 Compare: Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient 
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23(2) J. Legal Stud. 667 (supp. vol. 
1994); A. Mitchell Polinsky, supra note 72, at 124-27; Steven Shavell, supra note 72, at 
414 (1981).  
163 Compare: Cooter & Ulen, supra note 149, at 111. 
164 Kenneth J. Arrow, Little’s critique of welfare economics, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 5 (Dec., 1951), 923-934, at 927, referring to I. M. D. Little, A 
critique of welfare economics (Oxford, 1950) (suggesting focusing on 'average man' 
distribution of welfare, so to overcome the imprecision policy recommendations based 
on welfare economics imply). 
COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE 
 
32
4.   Distribution bares inefficient social costs 
 
Reshuffling copyright may not really have the distributive effects 
anticipated. The wealth effects of reshuffling copyright excludable rights in 
a world with no or very little transactions costs, particularly, tend to fall 
upon the network service providers and the music industry, not its users. In 
practice, service providers, as deep pockets, are natural targets for copyright 
litigation,165 much to their distributive justice-based dissatisfaction.166 The 
explanation to this phenomenon is largely twofold. To begin with, suppose 
that both infringers and music owners rent their web access from absentee 
network service providers, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs). If 
copyright law shifts the cost of preventing infringement from infringers to 
music owners, competition among ISPs may cause them to adjust rents to 
offset the change in costs. Specifically, network service providers such as 
file sharing software providers who own infringers’ web access will increase 
the rent charged to infringers, and the network service providers who own 
web access to music owners will decrease the rent charged from music 
owners. Consequently, the reshuffling of copyright excludable rights will 
not and does not affect the distribution of wealth between infringers and 
music owners. Instead, the network service providers who own access to 
infringing access gain and network service providers who own web access 
to music loose. Any change in the value of web access gets “capitalized” 
into rent. Consequently, the wealth effects of reshuffling copyright 
excludable rights in a world with no or very little transactions costs tend to 
fall upon the network service providers, not its users. 
 
Moreover, copyright law may affect distribution if digital music prices are 
also regulated, but then the price regulation itself may be used to accomplish 
redistribution among such parties. Also, there may be some incidental 
distributive effects of copyright rules, such as when copyright industries 
must expend resources to opt out of default rules that will not be suitable for 
them. For example, when corporations pay more for injuries to third parties, 
consumer prices and wages, typically, are affected.167 Thus, distributive 
justice argumentation, remarkably, arrived also from the part of copyright 
 
165 See Testimony to Congress about the bills that became the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act is set forth in The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection, 105th Cong. (1998), at 41 (statement of Business Software Alliance); See, 
David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History the Sweet And Sour Spots of the 
DMCA's Commentary, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 909, 917-18 (2002). 
166 See, Footnote 8 and accompanying text, id. 
167 Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra note 72, at 675 at Fn. 11. 
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holders,168 including motion picture studios, recording companies, 
songwriters, music publishers and others, who typically are accused in 
promoting efficiency and distributive injustice on the expense of poor users 
and creators. In other words, unless the compensation regime interferes, 
there is the risk that the lobbying efforts of the strong copyright industry are 
probable to be much more effectual than those of the weaker internet 
users.169 Thus, within the recent copyright file-sharing litigation, those who 
defend copyright or seek to extend it by now bemoan the decline in profits 
that record companies have suffered170 and that Hollywood may face – 
wrongly using this same flawed redistributive argumentation.171 This 
actuality, partly, also explains the copyright industries motivation to block 
the public's access to works of authorship disseminated by technologies, 
permitting them to control the terms and conditions of the access in both 
legislative and market-driven means. Beginning by means of legislation 
with the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992,172 followed by the Digital 
Performance in Sound Recordings Act of 1994,173 but then also by market 
efforts such as to encode digital video discs with mandatory Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) copy-blocking schemes.  
 
E. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Distributive concerns arise when individuals struggle over how a certain 
amount of wealth is to be divided up. Allocative matters, conversely, 
concern the progression of guiding resources into their most valued uses. 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution clearly reveals that copyright 
ultimately is about allocation of resources to those who most value them, 
namely the authors. To date, the Information age and cyberspace network 
technology has not truly changed this undemanding rationale. It is thus, still 
often impossible to redistribute income through the choice of copyright and 
that, even when it is possible, redistribution through the government’s tax 
and transfer system may be cheaper and is likely to be more precise. 
 
168 The studios and recording companies and the songwriters and music publishers filed 
separate suits against the defendants that were consolidated by the District Court. See, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, supra note 6, at 2771. 
169 See, Dagan, supra note 31, at. 755 and Fn. 38 & accompanying text. 
170 See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Recording Industry to Begin Collecting 
Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits Against File "Sharers" Who Illegally Offer Music 
Online, supra note 8. For evidence that services like Napster have in fact hurt the 
profits of record companies, see Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the 
Record Industry? The Evidence so Far (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript), at 
http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/records.pdf (Last visited 1 December 2005). 
171 See, e.g., Ronald Grover & Heather Green, The Digital Age Presents Hollywood Heist: 
Will Tinseltown Let Techies Steal the Show?, Bus. Wk., July 14, 2003, at 73, 76 
(reporting that Hollywood executives are concerned that the movie industry may suffer 
the same loss of profits suffered by the music industry). 
172 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237. 
173 Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336. 
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This essay hold the view that, it is, therefore, undesirable to instill our 
egalitarian commitments into copyright law, beyond the scope of concern 
for societal basic needs, in which the redistribution is paradigmatically only 
a side effect, even if their proposed purpose in this framework certainly is 
rather restrained. Cost-benefit analysis aimed at maximizing welfare, 
therefore, does not contend against distributive goals. However, in 
compliance with the prevailing utilitarian copyright paradigm, copyright 
should only avoid promoting distributive means. 
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